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Resumen
En este trabajo considero la determinación de las reservas internacionales en un contexto de
movilidad internacional de capital. Estudio un modelo donde las reservas representan un colateral
internacional para el endeudamiento externo, el cual se determina endógenamente por inversionistas
aversos al riesgo. Esta aproximación se aleja de los modelos tradicionales de demanda por reservas,
que enfatizan un marco basado en demanda por dinero o acumulación óptima de inventarios. Al
contrario que en la aproximación tradicional, encuentro que el efecto de variables como la tasa de
interés internacional y la volatilidad de la balanza de pagos tienen un efecto ambiguo sobre el nivel
de reservas. Acciones secuenciales por parte del Banco Central y del inversionista extranjero
rompen esta ambigüedad. La evidencia empírica es sugerente: mientras la tasa LIBOR y la
volatilidad de los términos del intercambio afectan positivamente el nivel de reservas en los países
de la OECD, este efecto se invierte en el resto de los países. Interpreto estos y otros resultados como
indicativos que la credibilidad en las acciones es un determinante importante del nivel de reservas y
de endeudamiento externo a través de distintos grupos de países.
Abstract
In this research, I assess the determinants of foreign exchange reserves under endogenous capital
flows. I consider a model where reserves represent collateral to international borrowing, which is
endogenously determined by risk averse foreign investors. This is a departure from usual models of
reserve accumulation, that focus solely on the portfolio decision of a central bank along the lines of
optimal inventory control models or precautionary saving. In contrast to this view, I find that the
expected effect on reserves of changes in the international interest rate or the volatility of the terms
of trade is ambiguous if actions are simultaneous. However, if foreign investors and the central
bank act sequentially, this ambiguity breaks down. Empirical evidence from OECD and non-OECD
economies is suggestive: while LIBOR and terms of trade volatility positively affects the demand
for reserves in OECD economies, the effects are reversed in non-OECD countries. This indicates
that commitment issues are an important factor in the determination of reserves in non-OECD
countries.
_______________________
Comments are welcome. The views presented in this paper do not necessarily represent the opinion
of the Central Bank of Chile.  This research is a modified version of Chapter 3 of the author's PhD
dissertation at MIT. I thank participants at seminars at the Central Bank of Chile, LACEA 1999,
and at the MIT International Economics and Money workshops for useful suggestions. I am
particularly grateful to Jaume Ventura, Rudi Dornbusch, Ricardo Caballero and José De Gregorio.
All remaining errors are mine. E-mail: pgarcia@condor.bcentral.cl1 I ntr oduction and M otivation
The volatility of the balance of payments has been at the center of policy discussion in
recent times, due the large real e®ects that seem to be associated with it. The literature
on optimal reserve demand has traditionally dealt with this issue by arguing that reserves
provide a bu®er stock that helps smooth the shocks to the balance of payments. This
traditional framework stems from the portfolio decision of a representative agent, along
the lines of a money demand equation or optimal inventory models. This is an adequate
framework in a situation with ¯xed exchange rates and pervasive capital controls, like
the pre-°oating era.
In a narrow sense the role of reserves as a bu®er stock has not changed. However,
the economic environment where small economies operate has undergone a large trans-
formation in the last few decades. Now it is aknowledged that the capital account of
small open economies displays large amounts of variation that are re°ected both in the
size and composition of capital °ows. Furthermore, small economies di®er markedly in
the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy. This is re°ected both in the choice
of the exchange rate regime and on the actual sterilization of sudden capital in°ows or
out°ows, the latter sometimes leading to balance of payments crisis.
These considerations loom large in the usefulness of traditional models of optimal
reserve determination. Indeed, in the presence of endogenous capital °ows, steriliza-
tion and default, the e®ect of various disturbances on reserves must be assessed in an
expanded setting that considers the interaction with international borrowing.
I will focus on a model of international borrowing and reserve accumulation, that
brings to the fore borrowing constraints, the endogenous determination of the probability
of default, and reserves as collateral. Demand for reserves and international borrowing
are determined jointly by the actions of an international lender and a central bank.
From a methodological point of view, this strategy implies leaving the current account
in the background. I think this is a realistic approach, as intertemporal models of the
current account (like in Obstfeld and Rogo® 1996, Frenkel and Razin 1996) are not able
to account for the large swings in relative prices and capital °ows that are observed over
time and across countries. Moreover, the theoretical implications on the equilibrium net
foreign asset position in less developed countries appear out of line with what is observed
in the data.1
This model will be used to assess the e®ect on reserves of the international interest
rate, the volatility of the terms of trade, and the choice of the exchange rate regime.
These issues are at the core of the literature on demand for reserves.
The traditional view in the literature is as follows.2 First, the international risk free
rate is typically related to the return earned on reserves. Hence, everything else constant
an increase in the risk free rate decreases the opportunity cost of holding reserves. As
demand is downward sloping, in equilibrium reserves increase. Second, an increase in the
1Obstfe ld a nd Ro g o ® (1 9 9 6 ), pp.1 1 6 ma k e this po int: a ba c k o f the e nv e lo pe c a lc ula tio n pre dic ts
unre a listic a lly la rg e c urre nt a c c o unt de ¯c its o n g ro w ing e c o no mie s. N o te tha t re c e nt w o rk by K ra y a nd
V e ntura (1 9 9 9 ) q ua li¯e s the se e ®e c ts fo r OEC D e c o no mie s.
2In ne x t se c tio n I g iv e a mo re de ta ile d re v ie w o f the lite ra ture
2volatility of the terms of trade increases the demand for reserves, through precautionary
saving motives. Third, countries with °exible exchange rates should be expected to hold
less reserves, as they instead use the °exibility of the exchange rate as an alternative
adjustment mechanism.
I will complement this traditional view with the endogenous determination of interna-
tional borrowing, considering that foreign exchange reserves are an important component
of the international collateral of the country. In this environment, the expected e®ect of
the international interest rate and the volatility of the terms of trade become ambiguous.
This ambiguity stems from two con°icting e®ects. On the one hand, changes in the in-
ternational interest rate directly a®ect the demand for reserves through the opportunity
cost argument described above. However, interest rate changes also induce a shift in
the portfolio of international investors, changing the need to hold reserves as collateral.
These two e®ects work in di®erent directions. Terms of trade volatility similarly has
con°icting e®ects.
The intuition for these results is as follows. If external borrowing is constrained
(because of moral hazard considerations for example) and reserves represent collateral
provided by the country and default is costly, the central bank will optimally demand
reserves. At the margin, the central bank chooses reserves in such a way that the
opportunity cost equals the marginal bene¯t, given by the decrease in the likelihood of
default times the cost of default. An increase in the international interest rate decreases
the opportunity cost, but also ceteris paribus decreases the amount of international
borrowing and thus the likelihood of default. An increase in the volatility of the terms
of trade increases the likelihood of default, hence increasing the demand for reserves.
However, foreign borrowing, and thus the likelihood of default decreases.
Commitment by either international lenders or the domestic central bank breaks
this ambiguity, as international borrowing and reserves are strategic complements in
the model. If the central bank can commit itself to hold a certain amount of reserves
before international borrowing is determined, then at the margin the traditional e®ect
of international interest rates and balance of payments volatility on reserve demand
dominates. Similarly, if international borrowing is determined before reserves, then at
the margin the e®ect of international interest rates and volatility work through the
decisions of the foreign investor. Hence it should be expected for example that increases
in international interest rates lower the demand for reserves.
I present empirical evidence that is broadly supportive of these claims. I estimate
reserve demands in a panel of small OECD and non-OECD countries over the period
1970 to 1998. I ¯nd that increases in the LIBOR as well as in the volatility of the
terms of trade are positively related to reserves in OECD countries. In non-OECD
countries however the results are reversed. Higher international interest rates and the
terms of trade volatility are negatively associated with reserves. This is in line with the
commitment argument outlined above.
Furthermore, I check the e®ect of the exchange rate regime and the maturity compo-
sition of external debt in non-OECD countries. The ¯ndings imply that a low stock of
reserves is associated to ¯xed exchange rates and short-term external debt. This points
out that ¯xed exchange rates per-se are not a su±cient commitment strategy.
3The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I provide a brief assesment
of the related literature. In Section 3 I construct a partial equilibrium model based on
porfolio choice, borrowing constraints, and costly default, that highlights the interaction
between the stock of reserves and foreign borrowing. I then analyze what is the role
of the international interest rate, the volatility of the terms of trade and the choice of
exchange rate arrangements in determining equilibrium reserves. In section 4 I estimate
a reduced form of the model in a panel of countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related liter atur e
The literature on the optimal level of international reserves dates back to interwar
attempts to reconstruct the international ¯nancial system. In the post-war era, the
Bretton-Woods arrangement and the creation of the IMF renewed the interest on the
topic 3; in a world economy where capital controls were prevalent and ¯xed exchange
rates were the norm, the adequate provision of liquidity in times of need was of ultimate
importance. This is the case even though the IMF, then and now, has the ability to
provide limited balance of payments support in times of crisis.
In the sixties, the development of money demand theory along the lines of optimal
inventory control provided a natural theoretical benchmark for the study of optimal
reserve accumulation. Indeed, a world of ¯xed exchange rates and capital controls closely
mimics the environment that a credit constrained individual agent faces in the economy.
This led to a large body of empirical research in the late sixties and early seventies.4
This framework was subsequently re¯ned theoretically and empirically. Frenkel and
Jovanovic (1981) focused on a stochastic inventory control model, explicitly considering
the process driving the balance of payments. In particular, they assumed that the
balance of payments is the following
dR(t) = ¡¹t +¾dW(t); R(0) = R0; ¹ ¸ 0 (1)
where W(t) is a Wiener process. Hence the change in reserves over a small time
interval dt has mean ¡¹dt and variance ¾2dt.
Furthemore, a cost of depletion D is incurred whenever reserves reach a lower bound.
Frenkel and Jovanovic relate this cost to the process of replenishment of the optimal stock
of reserves once it reaches the lower bound.5 More generaly, this cost can be associated
with the use of alternative balance of payments adjustment mechanisms once reserves
are depleted; the argument states that exchange rate, ¯scal and monetary policies are
more costly to implement without a bu®er of foreign exchange.6
3Grube l (1 9 7 1 ) c ite s Le a g ue o f N a tio ns (1 9 3 0 ) a nd IM F (1 9 5 8 ) a s e a rlie r e mpiric a l studie s
4F o r a re v ie w o f tha t lite ra ture , se e Grube l (1 9 7 1 ), K e lly (1 9 7 0 )
5T he ba sic fe a ture s o f the mo de l a re no t a lte re d if a n uppe r bo und fo r re se rv e a c c umula tio n is impo se d,
a s in Jung (1 9 9 5 ).
6A no the r w a y to unde rsta nd the c o st o f de ple tio n is to a sso c ia te it w ith c o stly re ne g o tia tio n.
4Apart from the cost of depletion, Frenkel and Jovanovic include a °ow cost r related
to the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Total cost minimization then leads to a
log-linear expression for the optimal level of reserves.
ln ¹ R = a0 +a1 ln¾ +a2 lnr +lnD (2)
where D is the depletion cost, r is the opportunity cost and ¾ is the measure of
balance of payments volatility.
An interesting aside of this literature is that it can be related to ¯rst generation
stochastic models of balance of payment crisis. Indeed, in these models the exchange
rate is ¯xed and reserves gradually fall, until they reach a lower bound where they are
suddendly depleted. Moreover, at the transition this is accompanied by a fall in money
demand, in such a way that there are no capital losses on the path to the °oating
exchange rate regime.7
Typically in these models domestic credit follows a stochastic process with drift,
which implies a steadily decreasing level of reserves, given money demand, that is rep-
resented by an equation like 1. Hence, Equation 2 can be interpreted as the desired
level of reserves by a central bank given that it knows it will be subject to a speculative
attack, and weighs the costs and bene¯ts of delaying reserve depletion.
Following this interpretation, the optimal reserve literature can be understood as
a ¯rst-stage portfolio problem where the central bank chooses the composition of its
balance sheet (given money demand).
This interpretation is useful because it highlights the partial equilibrium side of
traditional models of reserve demand. Indeed, terms of trade volatility and interest
rates are given exogenously and have unambiguos e®ects on the timing of the crisis.
Moreover, the estimation of Equation 2 has typically considered a scaling factor A.
Hence, the equation estimated becomes
ln ¹ R ¡lnA = a0 + a1ln¾ + a2lnr + lnD (3)
Equation 3 has been estimated over time and across countries. The literature has
paid particular attention to the empirical counterpart to measures of r, ¾, D and A. I
will brie°y describe the main approaches.8
Flow cost r. Edwards (1985) pointed out that this should be associated with an inter-
est rate spread, considering the interest paid on reserves, and the marginal opportunity
cost of using the stock of reserves. If at the margin investment is ¯nanced through
capital °ows, then the appropriate alternative cost should be the marginal utility of
consumption, or the interest on government debt.
7F lo o d a nd Ga rbe r (1 9 8 4 ) a nd D o rnbusc h (1 9 8 6 ) pro v ide the pro to ty pic a l mo de ls. Bro ne r (1 9 9 8 )
c o nside rs a v e rsio n in w hic h c a pita l lo sse s c a n o c c ur o n the tra nsitio n.
8A c o mple te surv e y o n the histo ric a l e mpiric s o f re se rv e de ma nd is o ut o f the sc o pe o f this re se a rc h.
T he mo re re c e nt lite ra ture is summa riz e d in M ille r (1 9 9 5 ), Liz o ndo a nd M a thie so n (1 9 8 7 ) a nd Ba hma ni-
Osk o o e e (1 9 8 5 )
5Volatility ¾. Here there are two approaches in the literature. One considers a direct
measure of balance of payments volatility. However, this variable is endogenous. Hence,
the volatility of export returns or the terms of trade seems is an appropriate choice for
small economies.
Cost of depletion D. Gottlieb and Ben-Bassat (1995) construct a discounted measure
of output losses after default, as a proxy for the cost of depletion. Mostly though this
term has been embedded in the estimation constant.
Scaling factor A. The tradition here has been to consider imports as the appropriate
scale for reserves. This has several shortcomings though. First, it does not consider the
e®ect of maturity mismatch on the severity of a balance of payments crisis. It can also
be argued that commercial credit is the last component of capital °ows that is subject
to borrowing constraints. The size and violence of capital out°ows in recent balance of
payments crisis, along with the large balance sheet e®ects that follow from the adjusment
in relative prices have been of the same order of magnitude as import compression.
These issues have been highlighted in recent research on the e®ect of capital market
imperfections in open economies (Caballero and Krashnamurthy 1998). Typically the
stock of international reserves will be the most readily available collateral in case of a
liquidity shock. Therefore, international reserve accumulation, by reducing the liquidity
premium on foreign investment in the country, creates a positive externality. However,
the degree to which reserves correspond to the total stock of international collateral
depends on the degree of ¯nancial development of the economy.9
All variables in Equation 3 are endogenous, in particular under international capital
mobility. The empirical section will detail in which way I will tackle this endogeneity
problem.
In the next section I construct a partial equilibrium model in which the stock of
reserves is determined jointly with international borrowing. This moves away from the
usual assumption that the reserves to imports ratio is the important consideration, and
focuses on the role of reserves as international collateral.
3 A model of inter national bor r owing and r eser ve accu-
mulation
I will consider a two period model of the balance of payments in which portfolio deci-
sions, given by external borrowing and reserve accumulation, are made in period 1. At
the beginning of period 2 uncertainty about the °ow of funds in the economy is revealed,
leading to the possibility of default. At the end of period 2 consumption occurs. Equilib-
rium in this stylized economy is determined by the interaction between two agents: (1)
a risk-averse lender which in period one determines the capital account of the economy,
9T his po int is stre sse d in A g hio n, Ba c he tta a nd Ba ne rje e (1 9 9 9 ). T he y fo c us o n the ro le o f c a pita l
ma rk e t impe rfe c tio ns in driv ing a g g re g a te °uc tua tio ns. In the ir mo de l, o nly c o untrie s a t a n inte rme -
dia te le v e l o f ¯na nc ia l de v e lo pme nt e x pe rie nc e c y c le s a s the e c o no my mo v e s be tw e e n c o nstra ine d a nd
unc o nstra ine d sta te s. H ig hly de v e lo pe d c o untrie s a nd c o untrie s a t lo w le v e ls o f de v e lo pme nt a re ne v e r
c o nstra ine d a nd a lw a y s c o nstra ine d, re spe c tiv e ly . T he re fo re the ir e c o no mie s do no t e x pe rie nc e c y c le s.
6and that in case of default only obtains the international collateral that is available,
which consist of the stock of international reserves accumulated by the central bank
in period 1. (2) a risk-neutral central bank that manages the capital account surplus
between a current account de¯cit and reserve accumulation, considering the alternative
cost of reserve accumulation, as well as the likelihood of costly default.
This model, by focusing on the capital account side of the balance of payments will
highlight the tradeo®s inherent in a world of international capital mobility.
It will be a partial equilibrium model: it assumes two speci¯c imperfections in the
economy. On the one hand (and as was mentioned above) there is a capital market
imperfections that leads to the existence of collateral. This can be motivated by a
variety of forms, but can be assumed to be the endogenous response of the central bank
to the existence of credit constraints.10 On the other hand, the reserve accumulation
decision is not privatized, and is undertaken by the central bank independently of the
private sector.
Borrowing constraints. The recent crisis in emerging markets has spurred a large
literature, in which borrowing constraints are a prime ingredient to understand volatility
(as in Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (1999)) and large swings of relative prices not
related to fundamentals (as the ¯re-sales in Caballero and Krishnamurthy 1998). In
these settings, the imperfections in capital markets imply that the constraints agents face
change endogenously according to the environment and the size of the shocks that hit
the economy. This is an important feature in countries with under-developed domestic
¯nancial markets, due either to a history of government default or of moral hazard
considerations that lead to distortions on the private allocation of credit by domestic
agents. 11
Centralization of Reserve management. Governments typically are in charge of re-
serve accumulation at the central bank. Or in other words, even though the stock of
reserves is rarely a policy objective per-se, the mix of monetary, ¯scal and exchange rate
policy, along with structural features of the economy, like the openness of the current and
capital account, imply a certain stock of reserves in equilibrium. However, some recent
experiences have shown how this role can be somewhat decentralized by the development
of the domestic ¯nancial sector. For example, the move towards narrow-banking under
a currency board allows a certain degree of privatization of reserve management. Also,
and related to the point above, in countries with a high degree of ¯nancial development
the private sector can hedge exchange rate risk. Some recent experiences though show
how in underdeveloped ¯nancial markets, the stock of international reserves at the cen-
tral bank ends up being the only usable international collateral under extreme ¯nancial
distress, either because of default on forward contracts or because of the fragility of the
banking sector.
Next I will focus on the behaviour of the agents in the economy and how reserves
10T he re fo re , by public ly pro v iding c o lla te ra l, the c e ntra l ba nk re la x e s the c re dit c o nstra ints o n the
e c o no my .
11C o rse tti, Pe se nti a nd Ro ubini (1 9 9 8 ) pre se nt a mo de l a lo ng the se line s, in w hic h a ba la nc e o f
pa y me nts c risis ha ppe ns no t be c a use o f the e x plic it g ro w th o f g o v e rnme nt lia bilitie s, but thro ug h the
implic it ba c k ing o f priv a te bo rro w ing .
7and international borrowing are determined. 12.
3.1 T he economic envir onment
The economy can be characterized as an asset that yields a stochastic °ow of tradable
production during period 2, given by YT. There is a debt contract between the domestic
owners of the productive asset and foreign lenders, that speci¯es a borrowing amount Bi
(denominated in foreign currency) and an interest rate ri on the loan. However, there will
be ex-post default if the tradeable resources available in the economy are not enough
to cover the repayment on the debt. These are YT plus the amount of international
collateral available, which I will relate to the stock of international reserves, adjusted
for the interest they receive abroad, assumed to be the riskless rate ½¤. Hence, default
occurs if
R(1+ ½¤) +YT < Bi(1 +ri) (4)
Equation 4 gives the probability of default, that can be related to the stochastic
behaviour of tradable output. Default occurs if YT < ¹ YT = Bi(1+ri)¡R(1+½¤). If YT
has a cdf given by ©(YT), then the probability of default is given by
Pr(default) = ©[Bi(1 +ri) ¡R(1 + ½¤)] = ©[ ¹ YT] (5)
3.2 Agents
The key ingredient of the model is the endogenous determination of the probability
of default, through the interaction between foreign investors that determine external
borrowing Bh and the Central Bank that sets reserve accumulation R.
The foreign investor. The foreign investor has wealth W, that it can allocate either
to a loan to the domestic ¯rm or to an emerging market mutual fund, with returns
with mean ½ and variance ¾2. Given that default is possible, the return on the loan is
stochastic. In particular, the expected return ½i and variance ¾2
i on the loan are given
by














Now, from Equations 6 and 7 we see that the extent of borrowing a®ects both
the mean and variance of the returns. I will assume however that the bank behaves
12Pa rt o f the mo de l is ba se d o n F re nk e l a nd Ra z in (1 9 9 6 )
8competitively, hence it does not internalize these e®ects. This can be justi¯ed by thinking
of the representative bank as the collection of a large number of identical nean-variance
banks. Thus, if a share µ of its wealth is allocated to the domestic economy, utility is
given by
U(W) = µ½i + (1 ¡ µ)½ ¡
°
2
(µ2¾i + (1 ¡ µ)2¾)








i + ¾2 (8)
Clearly, the country faces an upward sloping supply of foreign capital.
The Central Bank. The Central Bank demands reserves considering an exogenous
cost of depletion and default given by D. This can be rationalized as costly macroeco-
nomic adjustment following a balance of payments crisis, the ¯scal costs of the bailout
of ¯nancially insolvent institutions, or as the reputational cost of renegotiation after
default occurs.
Furthermore, there is a °ow cost of holding reserves. This is typicaly associated
with the need to sterilize reserve accumulation by raising domestic interest rates. Also,
it can be related to the opportunity cost of reserves given by the alternatives to re-
serve accumulation, like the payment of existing government debt, the marginal utility
of consumption or the productivity of capital. As stressed by Edwards(1985), this op-
portunity cost must consider the return earned by reserves. In this case, I will simply
assume that this cost is represented by the spread between a domestic interest rate ½d
over the risk-free rate in foreign currency ½¤.
Hence, total expected cost faced by the central bank is
TC = ©D +(1 ¡©)(½d ¡½¤)R (9)




1 ¡©[ ¹ YT]
Á[ ¹ YT]
(10)
where as before YT denotes the threshold amount of tradable output that allows no
default.
Equations 6, 7, 8 and 10 characterize equilibrium. Next, I will turn to the deter-
mination of equilibrium, and to the comparative statics of changes in the international
interest rate and the volatility of the balance of payments.
Equations 8 and 10 describe the optimal response schedules of the investment bank
and the central bank. Here I will characterize these best responses, and explore the role
of sequencing.
93.3 E quilibr ium
First, note that reserve accumulation a®ects both the mean and the variance of the































Thus, ceteris paribus changes in reserves have an unambiguous e®ect on the extent









Regarding the determination of reserves, note that Equation 10 can be written as
R =
D
½d ¡½¤ ¡ ¤¡1 (12)
where ¤ is the default hazard.
A particular case is the exponential distribution. In this setting, the hazard is con-
stant, hence reserves are uniquely determined by D, ½h¡½¤ and a constant ¤. Moreover,
log-linearization of 12 implies
lnR = ¯[lnD +ln(½¤ ¡½d)]+ (1¡ ¯)ln¤
This is the traditional reserve demand that has been estimated in the literature (like
Equation 3). In this setting, balance of payments volatility(through the e®ect on the
hazard ¤) and the international interest rate have unambiguous e®ects on the demand
for reserves









Hence, whether reserves increase in the face of changes in international borrowing
hinges on two e®ects. On the one hand, to keep the spread constant reserves increase one
on one with international borrowing. This e®ect is dampened by an additional factor,
related to the e®ect through the shape of the default hazard. This is the second term in
10Equation 13. Note that ¹ Á0 < 0 is su±cient to ensure that the second e®ect is actually
positive.13
Given that for the foreign investor @Bi=@R > 0 and that for the Central Bank
@R=@Bi > 0, reserves and international borrowing are strategic complements. This
implies that sequencing of the actions can potentially a®ect the equilibrium and the
comparative statics response to exogenous shocks. Below I discuss these issues, ¯rst
focusing on a simultaneous solution, and then examining the e®ect of sequencing.
3.4 Compar ative statics - N ash equilibr ium
Nash equilibrium is obtained if actions are simultaneous, using Equations 10 and 8 to
solve for Bi and R.
In equilibrium, ½¤ will have two e®ects on reserves. First, the direct e®ect that works
through the opportunity cost. This is the traditional e®ect that has been stressed in the
literature on reserve demand. However, there is an additional e®ect operating through
the crisis hazard. Indeed, changes in ½ or ¾2 also change ¤ through the e®ect on the
portfolio composition of the investment bank. Everything else constant, an increase
in foreign borrowing increases the likelihood of default. This leads the central bank
to increase its demand for reserves. This e®ect works in the opposite direction of the
opportunity cost.
The other interesting comparative statics exercise is to see the e®ect of an increase
in country-speci¯c volatility. This was associated above with the volatility of output
YT, or equivalently in this formulation, with the volatility of the real exchange rate. For
both reasons I want to associate it with the volatility of the terms of trade, arguably
exogenous in small economies.
What is the e®ect of a mean-preserving spread on the pdf ©? Again, everything
else constant this will increase the probability of default. As with the case of the risk
free interest rate, this has opposite e®ects on international borrowing and the demand
for reserves. On the one hand, international borrowing decreases, thus diminishing the
need to keep reserves as collateral for the loan. On the other hand, the increase in the
likelihood of default leads the central bank to want to hold more reserves. The ¯nal
e®ect is ambiguous. Figure 1 shows the comparative statics.
13T he a de q ua te ha z a rd to a ssume a t this sta g e de pe nds o n the na ture o f the sho c k tha t driv e s the
pro c e ss fo r Y . F o r e x a mple , a lo g no rma l distributio n fo r o utput Y implie s a ha z a rd tha t is no t mo no to nic .
H o w e v e r, this do e s no t ne c e ssa rily imply a ne g a tiv e sig n fo r the de riv a tiv e @R=@Bi. A We ibull ha z a rd
do e s imply mo no to nic ity .
11Figure 1 - Increase in volatility or ½¤.
3.5 Compar ative statics - Sequential equilibr ium
In this model, reserves and international borrowing are strategic complements, and there
is an externality given by the existence of costly default and the role of collateral. The
externality however is di®erent for both agents; reserves have a positive externality on
international borrowing, given by the fact that a small increase in reserves lowers the
probability of default and hence increases the expected return for the foreign investor.
On the other hand, international borrowing has a negative externality on the central
bank: increases in international borrowing, everything else constant, imply a higher
likelihood of default.
Thus, the sequencing of the actions will crucially a®ect the comparative statics re-
sults, like the e®ect of changes in international interest rates and the volatility of the
terms of trade.
For example, consider the situation where the central bank moves ¯rst, and sets
the amount of reserves before international borrowing is determined. Envelope theorem
arguments imply that there is a small loss of deviating from the best response, but a ¯rst
order gain because of the externality. In other words, a small increase in reserves implies
a ¯rst order reduction in the probability of default, while only having a negligible e®ect
on the opportunity cost. Hence, the central bank will choose a higher level of reserves
than in the Nash equilibrium. This will then imply a higher degree of foreign lending
by the investment bank.
The situation is opposite if the investment bank moves ¯rst. Indeed, in this case
the incentive is to reduce external borrowing. Given reserves, reducing Bi reduces the
probability of default.
12What are the implications of sequential actions on the comparative statics? If com-
plementarities are not too large, relative to the direct e®ect if changes in fundamentals
(international interest rates and the volatility of the terms of trade), then the sequenc-
ing of the actions makes the ambiguity described above less probable.14 Indeed, in this
setting changes in the fundamentals can be fully internalized by the leader. This implies
that if the investment bank moves ¯rst, then increases in the international interest rate
(or the volatility of the terms of trade) are re°ected in a reduction in reserves. The
opposite happens if the central bank moves ¯rst.
To summarize, the incorporation of endogenous capital mobility in a standard model
of reserve demand makes the e®ect of international interest rates and terms of trade
volatility ambiguous. However, this ambiguity breaks down under sequential actions by
the the agents. This conclusion is similar to the e®ect of commitment on the soverign
debt literature. As noted by Eaton and Fernandez (1995), a debtor has reasons to modify
its actions to increase repayment if it can commit to taking those actions before credit
terms are established. However, once those terms are set, incentives are reversed.
3.6 I ncr easing mar ginal cost of r eser ve accumulation
Although the portfolio decisions by domestic agents (investment or money demand for





That is, there is an increasing marginal cost to sterilization of capital °ows. This
e®ect can be motivated in several ways. As a °ow, it is the case that reserve accumulation
dampen investment that would be channeled through a current account de¯cit. As a
stock, higher reserves imply a lower supply of net domestic credit, given money demand.
Both e®ects would imply an increasing relationship between domestic interest rates and
the stock of international reserves.
3.7 M ultiple E quilibr ia?
The non linearity Equations 8 and 10 might give rise to multiple equilbria, as shown
in Figure 2. In this case the sequencing of the actions is even more relevant, as it can
help coordinate one equilibria instead of another one.
14A c tua lly , it implie s tha t the siz e o f the se t o f pa ra me te rs unde r w hic h the re sults a re a mbig uo us is
re duc e d.
13Figure 2 - Possibility of multiple equilibria.
4 E mpir ics
What has been the behaviour of reserves in the post-war era? Is there evidence point-
ing towards the expanded role stressed above? Is it possible to resolve the theoretical
ambiguity on the e®ect of crucial variables like the international interest rate and terms
of trade volatility? Below I present empirical estimates of reserve demand that will try
to clarify these issues, by using postwar data to estimate reserve demand equations for
OECD and non-OECD countries.
4.1 Reser ves in the post-war per iod
To get a ¯rst look at the evidence, Figures 3 and 4 display the evolution of the average
reserves to imports ratio and the average reserves to external liabilities ratio, along
with nominal LIBOR, in OECD and non-OECD countries. Table 1 shows the countries
included and how they are classi¯ed according to OECD membership and oil production.
Several features are apparent.
First, the volatility and trend of reserves over imports display large changes over the
period, with the seventies and early eithties being a particularly turbulent decade. Three
features of this period stand out on the data. First, the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods
arrangement and the devaluation of the dollar, leading to a sharp increase in reserves;
second, the oil shocks in the early and late seventies, and third the large increase in
nominal interest rates in the early eigties. It is readily apparent how these shocks
a®ected reserves in di®erent countries.
14Secondly, the reduction on the LIBOR after 1980 led to a parallel increase in reserves
over imports, that lasts well into the nineties. This is particularly noteworthy for the
non-oecd, non-oil economies: both the trend and cycle of reserves over imports seems to
be associated with the movements in the nominal LIBOR. Moreover, the sharp increase
in reserves over imports seemed to slow down in the mid nineties. This coincides with
the recovery of the US economy from the 1990-1991 recession and the gradual increase
in interest rates.
Over the long run, the ratio of reserves to imports has increased in all country
groupings, almost doubling from a few months of imports to half a year. Part of this
increase can be attributed to movements in nominal interest rates. As mentioned above,
these movements stand in stark contrast with the expected e®ect of international interest
rates on reserve demand, and closely mirrors the well-known relationship between capital
°ows to developing countries and international interest rates, noted in IDB(1996) and
World Bank (1997).
Moreover, the evolution of ratio of reserves to international liabilities also displays a
di®erent picture across country groupings. First, reserves over international liabilities in
OECD countries seem to move in tandem with LIBOR. However, for non-OECD coun-
tries the relationship is the opposite: increases in LIBOR are accompanied by substantial
falls in reserves over external debt. This has an immediate interpretation in terms of the
ease of access to international ¯nancial markets as a substitute to reserve accumulation.
When LIBOR is high, OECD countries tend to substitute external debt for reserves. On
the other hand, non-OECD countries su®er the opposite e®ect: not only when LIBOR
is high the cost of indebtedness increases, but also capital °ows make the self-provision
of international liquidity more di±cult.



















































































16Figure 4 - Reserves over international liabilities





































































































174.2 Data and estimation
I will focus on the following panel data speci¯cation for the demand for reserves, by
country i as of period t. Variables are de¯ned as in the model above, and below is a
description of their empirical counterparts.






+a2ln¾it +a3 lnBit + lnDi + ´it (14)
In this equation, there are time-speci¯c and country-speci¯c components. The time-
speci¯c element comes from the international interest rate ½¤
t. On the other hand,
the country-speci¯c e®ect re°ects the cost of default in the equation for reserves Di,
and other unspeci¯ed country components in foreign borrowing that can be related to
changes in investor's wealth, risk aversion, or the opportunities for international porfolio
diversi¯cation. As this equation is a reduced form, the expected sign of the coe±ents is
ambiguous. That is the reason why I scale by foreign borrowing Bit.
Below I give a more detailed description of the data used in the empirical estimation.
Table 1 shows the countries and some data related issues that will be discussed below.
15
International borrowing. Even though there is good data availability on reserves
both on the time-series and cross-country dimension, this is not at all the case for other
components of countries' balance sheets. I will use proxies for international borrowing.
There are two basic cross-country candidates for the stock of foreign liabilities, that
happen to be closely related to other country speci¯c variables, like ¯nancial development
and income per capita. One is gross liabilites, from the international investment position
of countries. This data is available for some developed countries on an annual basis. This
data though does not in general span a long period of time. Also, it is not available
for most of the less developed countries. However, there is World Bank data on stocks
of external debt for many LDC since 1970. Table 1 shows which data is available for
which country in the sample.
Balance of payments volatility. I construct a measure of balance of payments volatil-
ity based on the stochastic behaviour of the detrended terms of trade. This is an appro-
priate measure for many reasons. Firsr, it allows the speci¯cation to be compatible with
previous literature, and is available for a large number of countries over a long period of
time. Moreover, for a subset of countries it is possible to construct separate export and
import price volatilites. Second, the terms of trade display large amounts of volatility,
both over time and across countries. Furthermore, terms of trade shocks have both
income and subtitution e®ects, thus a®ecting not only the intratermporal allocation of
resources but also leading to intertemporal smoothing of consumption. This proxying
for precautonary saving motives that determine the current account. Third, and related
15In this ta ble \ iip x x " re fe rs to inte rna tio na l inv e stme nt po sitio n fro m IF S, a v a ila ble sinc e 1 9 x x . \ x ,m
uv " implie s a v a ila bility o f e x po rt a nd impo rt unit v a lue inde x e s, a lso fro m IF S. \ to t" a nd \ x td" a re te rms
o f tra de inde x a nd e x te rna l de bt fro m Wo rld D e v e lo pme nt Indic a to rs. Oil c o untrie s a re N o rw a y , Ec ua do r,
V e ne z ue la , K uw a it, Sa udi A ra bia a nd Indo ne sia . In bo ld a re the c o untrie s tha t a re use d in the ¯na l
e stima tio n in T a ble 6 .
18Table 1: Country classi¯cations
OECD Non-OECD
country balance sheet terms of country balance sheet terms of
data trade data trade
UK iip 80 x,m uv Turkey iip 83 x,m uv
Austria iip 80 n/a South Africa iip 86 x,m uv
Belgium n/a n/a Argentina xtd tot
Denmark iip 91 x,m uv Bolivia xtd tot
France iip 89 x,m uv Brazil xtd tot
Italy iip 72 x,m uv Chile xtd tot
Netherlands iip 82 x,m uv Colombia xtd x,m uv
Norway iip 88 x,m uv Costa Rica xtd tot
Sweden iip 82 x,m uv Ecuador xtd x uv, tot
Switzerland iip 84 x,m uv Paraguay xtd x uv, tot
Canada iip 48 x,m uv Peru xtd x uv, tot
Finland iip 75 x,m uv Uruguay xtd tot
Greece n/a x,m uv Venezuela iip 83, xtd x,m uv
Iceland iip 88 x,m uv Israel n/a x,m uv
Ireland n/a x,m uv Jordan n/a x,m uv
Portugal iip 93 x,m uv Kuwait n/a n/a
Spain iip 81 x,m uv Saudi Arabia n/a/ x,m uv
Australia iip 86 x,m uv Egypt xtd tot
New Zealand iip 89 x,m uv Taiwan n/a n/a
Hong Kong n/a x,m uv
Indonesia xtd x uv, tot
Korea iip 80 x,m uv
Malaysia iip 80 xtd tot
Philippines xtd x,m uv
Singapore n/a x,m uv
Thailand xtd x,m uv
Algeria xtd tot
Morocco xtd x,m uv
19to the other points, the terms of trade are strongly correlated with the real exchange
rate, thus reinforcing the aforementioned e®ects.
The volatility measure will stem from the construction of rolling variances for the
detrended terms of trade. Table 1 shows the sources available for terms of trade data.
The data comes from either export and import unit values from IFS, or directly from
World Bank data. It spans various time periods, depending on the country. I will apply




t be the terms of trade for a given
country. I run an AR(1) process with a quadratic trend, hence
pt = ±0 + ±1pt¡1 + ±2t+ ±3t2 +´t









A similar procedure was done to export and import unit value indexes, de°ated by
the US wholesale price index. Furthermore, this allows to construct dollar measures of








The detrended component of de°ated exports, XT

















The same procedure was done for imports.
How good are these measures of volatility in accounting for the actual volatility of
reserves? By directly detrending reserves 16 it is possible to compare these measures.
Tabletbl:volat gives the result of several panel estimations. It is clear that in the within
and random e®ects speci¯cation the terms of trade volatility is a good proxy. This is
expected from a measurement point of view. Indeed, the terms of trade is an index,
hence the scaling of this variable is the same for all countries. This is not so using the
20Table 2: Volatility measures in the sample
terms of trade volatility
pooled within GLS between
¾t 0.0752 0.514 0.496 -0.330
(0.059) (0.048) (0.048) (0.322)
R2 0.002 0.119 0.033 0.033
p-hausman 0.002
export and import volatility
pooled within GLS between
¾x
t 0.346 0.375 0.371 0.273
(0.028) (0.032) (0.031) (0.161)
¾m
t 0.453 0.307 0.316 0.532
(0.453) (0.033) (0.033) (0.167)
R2 0.723 0.693 0.7240 0.704
p-hausman 0.193
measures of export and import volatility as by construction they are denominated in
1990 dollars.
Interest rates.There are no comparable measures of domestic interest rates for the
broad cross-section of countries I am considering. I will follow three strategies to deal
with this issue. First, I will use the data that is available at the country level on
government bondyields, andlaking that, on lending rates by the ¯nancial sector. Second,
I will exclude the domestic interest rate from the estimation.17. Third, I will rely on
macroeconomic data on consumption growth rates to construct discount factors based
on traditional asset pricing equations. Even though this is a bad proxy for domestic
interest rates if agents are credit constrained, it captures the countercyclicality of the
opportunity cost of holding reserves; i.e. during slowdowns this opportunity cost is larger
than in expansions.
A Ramsey type model of growth and consumption implies a relationship between











where º and ³ re°ect the intertemporal discount factor and elasticity of substitution.
Hence, the opportunity cost in Equation 14 can be proxied by
16T he de tre nding o f re se rv e s w a s do ne line a rly , inste a d o f lo g -line a rly
17T his is a de q ua te a s lo ng a s the do me stic inte re st ra te is e ndo g e no usly de te rmine d by th re st o f the















In this speci¯cation, I take as a benchmark ³ = 1, while º is subsumed in the
constant.
As a measure of the international interest rate, I use the six-month LIBOR. I also
include imports as an additional scaling variable on the right hand side.
In equation 14 most of the variables are endogenous. This is inevitable given the
empirical strategy that has been chosen. However, several factors help control in part for
this endogeneity. First, the small country assumption implies that both the international
interest rate and the volatility of the terms of trade are exogenous. Second, by focusing
on two measures of the domestic interest rate, and also excluding it from the estimation,
it is possible to assess the degree of bias on the rest of the estimates. Third, the model
in Section 2 suggests that the sequencing of actions should lead to di®erent signs on the
e®ects of the right hand side variables on reserves. If one assumes that the ability to
commit di®ers between OECD and non-OECD countries, then estimating Equation 14
separately for each country grouping provides a way to control for the endogeneity
problem.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the estimation results for the di®erent ways to deal with
domestic interest rates.
The results are suggestive, both within as well as between country groupings. First,
inall estimations involving non-OECD countries, the e®ect of LIBOR is highly signi¯cant
and large but negative. This is as expected from inspection of Figure 3. A 1 percentage
point increase in LIBOR is associated with a 4% to 8% drop in reserves. It is noteworthy
that this result is not preserved in OECD economies. In most of the estimates LIBOR
is not signi¯cant, and is positive in some of the speci¯cations (Table 4 and 5).
Volatility presents a similar pattern. Using the measure of terms of trade volatility,
it is found that it is negatively associated with reserves in non-OECD countries. This is
reversed for the case of OECD countries. Note though that using the measures of export
and import volatility lead to negative coe±cients in all country groupings. It is possible
that this is capturing within group heterogeneity. Indeed, as terms of trade volatility
is constructed from an index it is scale invariant. The measures of export and import
volatility on the other hand are denominated in dollars.
How do these results compare to previous literature? Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981),
in a pre-°oating sample of OECD countries ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of the opportunity
cost and volatility on reserves, in line with the theory based on inventory control. The
results here for OECD countries are compatible with this previous literature. However,
for non-OECD countries the international interest rate a®ects reserves negatively.
4.3 E xchange r ate r egimes and the matur ity of exter nal debt
As commitment and the sequencing of actions are expected to be important issues on
the determination of reserve demand, I explore the e®ect on the estimated equations of




1+½h 0.080 -0.082 1.262 0.932
(0.112) (0.103) (0.366) (0.377)
ln(1 +½¤) -7.287 -0.683
(1.650) (1.323)
ln(1 +½d) -0.147 0.446
(0.346) (0.262)
¾ -0.283 -0.205 0.445 0.437





lnB 0.294 0.098 -0.091 0.855 0.585 0.468
(0.063) (0.074) (0.123) (0.085) (0.139) (0.122)
lnM 0.859 1.246 0.659 0.677
(0.119) (0.153) (0.412) (0.180)
R2 0.236 0.392 0.412 0.712 0.746 0.596
sample 17 17 9 8 8 12
# obs. 222 222 128 65 65 182
23Table 4: Fixed e®ects estimation - No domestic interest rate
non-OECD OECD
ln(1 + ½¤) -1.281 -1.281 -6.552 1.565 -0.843 0.913
(1.128) (1.128) (1.297) (2.045) (2.048) (1.513)
¾ -0.164 -0.164 0.321 0.461





lnB 0.588 0.224 0.102 1.001 0.536 0.577
(0.058) (0.061) (0.089) (0.105) (0.179) (0.141)
lnM 0.962 1.109 0.937 0.501
(0.088) (0.117) (0.298) (0.208)
R2 0.228 0.410 0.575 0.699 0.745 0.521
sample 19 19 11 8 8 12
# obs. 408 408 200 67 67 189




C+1=C -1.927 -1.884 -1.093
(0.391) (1.438) (1.438)
ln(1 +½¤) -1.368 -4.871 3.234 -0.228
(0.907) (1.269) (1.834) (1.439)
ln(C+1=C) 2.076 3.076 4.429 1.976
(0.448) (0.896) (1.637) (1.583)
¾ -0.063 -0.058 0.051 0.182





lnB 0.294 0.267 0.397 0.757 0.533 0.649
(0.063) (0.074) (0.107) (0.234) (0.223) (0.193)
lnM 0.901 0.918 0.574 0.631 1.192 0.496
(0.096) (0.099) (0.161) (0.419) (0.412) (0.324)
R2 0.397 0.398 0.361 0.732 0.789 0.496
sample 19 19 12 7 7 7
# obs. 383 383 179 52 52 52
25including two other measures of countries ability or willingness to commit. There are
the exchange rate regime and the maturity structure of foreign debt. I will focus on
non-OECD countries, given the availability of data on short and long term debt data for
LDC's. I construct a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for °exible exchange rate
regimes and 0 otherwise. I use the exchange rate regime classi¯cation of Cottareli and
Giannini (1997), based on IMF criteria. Table 6 shows the result of the estimation.
Including these variables doesn't a®ect the rest of the coe±cients.18 Also an inter-
esting asymmetry is apparent. Although long term debt is related to reserves in the
expected way, short term debt negatively a®ects reserves. If the variable included is the
log of the ratio of long to short term debt, it can be seen that a 10% increase in this ratio
leads to a 1.5% increase in reserves. Moreover, °exible exchange rates are associated
with a larger stock of reserves. This also is in contrast with the usual view that ¯xed
exchange rates imply a larger stock of reserves. However, ¯xed exchange rate regimes
have been a poor commitment device in non-OECD countries, being instead on of the
ingredients that characterize the run-up to balance of payments crisis. On the other
hand, the lack of ability to commit should be re°ected by a shorter maturity structure
of the debt that the country issues.
5 Concluding Remar ks
Under capital mobility the traditionale®ects of interestrate movements andthe volatility
of the balance of payment on reserve become theoretically ambiguous. This ambiguity
is resolved by the sequencing of actions by the central bank and the foreign investor.
This is in line with the empirical results. In countries less able to commit (as most
non-OECD countries), reserves are negatively associated with the international interest
rate. The relationship is very strong. A 1 percentage point increase in LIBOR leads to
a drop in reserves of between 4% and 7% in non-OECD countries. For OECD countries
the results are di®erent; the international interest rate does a®ect reserves in the way
implied by traditional models of reserve demand.
Terms of trade volatility also displays opposite e®ects on reserve demand depeding
on the country grouping. For non-OECD countries, higher volatility is associated with
lower reserves, while the opposite happens in OECD countries.
These results are not sensitive to the choice of the domestic interest rate. In the
three cases considered both LIBOR and terms of trade volatility present this opposite
e®ects on reserves between OECD and non-OECD countries.
These results are supportive of the argument developed in the model above. The
ability to commit determines the expected sign of exogenous shocks to demand for re-
serves. The empirical evidence suggests that countries with a lower degree of ¯nancial
development are less able to commit in this sense, and therefore the stock of reserves is
sensitive to international capital °ows and its determinants. On the other hand, more
developed countries, like the OECD countries in the sample, are able to commit and
therefore determine their stock of reserves independently. Empirical measures of com-
18Se e T a ble 5 a nd T a ble 6 .
26Table 6: Exchange rate regime and debt composition
non-OECD
ln(1 + ½¤) -4.855 -3.069 -4.423 -3.069 -3.891
(1.326) (1.042) (1.282) (1.042) (1.139)
ln(C+1=C) 3.019 2.232 2.441 2.233 2.319
(0.934) (0.911) (0.913) (0.911) (0.907)
¾x -0.023 0.004 0.0155 0.0049 0.009
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
¾m -0.109 -0.127 -0.159 -0.127 -0.143







lnM 0.486 0.879 0.674 0.879 0.763
(0.169) (0.138) (0.171) (0.137) (0.150)
ER 0.468 0.414 0.417
(0.132) (0.137) (0.135)
R2 0.344 0.399 0.361 0.399 0.404
sample 10 10 10 10 10
# obs 160 160 160 160 160
27mitment, like the maturity of the external debt and the exchange rate regime also give
some insight about this issue. Indeed, estimates show that a short maturity of external
debt is associated with lower reserves. If maturity is an indication of commitment, then
this is in line with the model. More short term debt signals a lower ability to commit,
and hence is associated with lower reserves. The exchange rate regime dummy used
in the estimation implies that ¯xed exchange rates are associated with lower reserves.
Again, this feature can be a re°ection of lack of commitment. Indeed, ¯xed exchange
rates in non-OECD countries have been a feature of balance of payments crises in the
sample period. In that sense, it is hard to argue that ¯xed exchange rate regimes nece-
sarily represent a useful commitment strategy, if they are not complemented with other
institutional features that allow the peg to survive.
Refer ences
[1] Aghion, P., P. Bachetta and A. Banerjee (1999), \Capital Markets and the Insta-
bility of Open Economies", mimeo MIT.
[2] Bahmani-Oskooee M. (1985), \Demand for International Reserves, survey of recent
empirical studies", Applied Economics 17, 359-75.
[3] Ben-Bassat, A. and D. Gottlieb (1992), \Optimal International Reserves and
sovereign Risk", Journal of International Economics 33, 354-62.
[4] Caballero, R. and Krishnamurthy (1998), \Emerging Market Crises: An asset Mar-
kets Perspective", mimeo MIT.
[5] Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti and N. Roubini (1998), \What caused the Asian Currency
and Financial Crisis?", mimeo NYU
[6] Eaton, J. and R. Fernandez (1995), \Sovereign Debt", in Handbook of International
Economics vol.3 G. Grossman and K, Rogo® eds., AMsterdam: North Holland.
[7] Edwards, S. (1985), \On the Interest-Rate elasticity of the demand for Interna-
tional Reserves: Some evidence from Developing Countries", Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance 4, 287-95.
[8] Frenkel, J. and A. Razin (1996), Fiscal Policies and Growth in the World Economy,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[9] Frenkel, J. and B. Jovanovic (1981), \Optimal International Reserves: A stochastic
framework", The Economic Journal 91, 507-14.
[10] Furman, J. and J. Stiglitz (1998), \Economic crisis: Evidence and insights from
East Asia", Brooking Papers on Economic Activity' 2:1998, pp 1-115.
[11] Grubel, H. (1971), \The Demand for International Reserves: a Critical Review of
the Literature", Journal of Economic Literature 9, 1148-66.
28[12] Interamerican Development Bank (1996), Volatile Capital Flows: Taming their im-
pact on Latin America, Hausman, R. and L. Rojas-Suarez (eds.), Baltimore MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
[13] International Monetary Fund (1958), International Liquidity and Reserves, Wash-
ington, DC.
[14] Jung, C. (1995), \Optimal Management of International Reserves", Journal of
Macroeconomics 17, 601-21.
[15] Kelly, M (1970), \The Demand for International Reserves", American Economic
Review 59, 655-67.
[16] Kray, A. and J. Ventura (1999), \Current Accounts in Debtor and Creditor Coun-
tries", mimeo MIT.
[17] Lizondo, J. and D. Mathieson (1987), \The Stability of the Demand for Interna-
tional Reserves", Journal of International Money and Finance 6, 231-82.
[18] League of Nations (1930), Interim report of the gold delegation to the ¯nancial
committee, Geneva.
[19] Miller, N. (1995), \Managing International Reserves in Developing Countries",
Asian Development Review 13, 54-77.
[20] Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogo® (1996), Foundations of International Macroeconomics,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[21] Parker, J. (1999), \Spendthrift in America: on two decades of decline in the US
personal saving rate", NBER mimeo.
[22] World Bank (1997), Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The road to
Financial Integration. Washington DC.
29Documentos de Trabajo
Banco Central de Chile
Working Papers
Central Bank of Chile
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES PAST ISSUES
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia
impresa con un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se
pueden hacer por fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@condor.bcentral.cl
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm. Hard copy versions can be ordered individually
for US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be place by fax: (56-2)
6702231 or email: bcch@condor.bcentral.cl
DTBC-57
Origins and Resolution of a Banking Crisis: Chile 1982-86
Edgardo Barandiarán y Leonardo Hernández
Diciembre 1999
DTBC-56
Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes
Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine y Norman Loayza
Diciembre 1999
DTBC-55
Inflation Targets and Stabilization in Chile
Oscar Landerretche, Felipe Morandé y Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
Diciembre 1999
DTBC-54




Series de Ahorro e Ingreso por Agente Económico
en Chile, 1960-1997
Herman Bennett, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel y Claudio Soto
Diciembre 1999
DTBC-52
Integración Financiera y Coordinación Macroeconómica
en el Mercosur
Carlos Budnevich y Roberto Zahler
Diciembre 1999
DTBC-51
Determinants of Current Account Deficits in Developing Countries
César Calderón, Alberto Chong y Norman Loayza
Noviembre 1999DTBC-50
The Effect of Capital Controls on Interest Rate Differentials
Luis Oscar Herrera y Rodrigo Valdés
Noviembre 1999
DTBC-49
Cuenta Corriente y Desvíos Transitorios en Términos de
Intercambio y Volúmenes de Exportaciones: Chile 1985-1999
Jaime Guajardo y Guillermo Le Fort
Noviembre 1999
DTBC-48
Do Depositors Punish Banks for “Bad” Behavior?:
Examining Market Discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico
María Soledad Martínez y Sergio Schmukler
Noviembre 1999
DTBC-47
What Drives Private Saving Across the World?
Norman Loayza, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel y Luis Servén
Noviembre 1999
DTBC-46
Exchange Rate Volatility and Risk-Premium
Claudio Soto y Rodrigo Valdés
Septiembre 1999
DTBC-45
Private Capital Inflows and the Role of Economic Fundamentals
Vittorio Corbo y Leonardo Hernández
Diciembre 1998
DTBC-44




Macroeconomic Policies, Instability, and Growth in the World
Ibrahim Elbadawi y Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
Diciembre 1998
DTBC-42





Empirical Regularities of Chilean Business Cycles
Agnès Belaisch y Claudio Soto
Diciembre 1998
DTBC-40
Evaluación del Sistema Tributario Chileno y Propuesta de Reforma
Pablo Serra
Diciembre 1998